Back in October 2022, as Rishi Sunak took over as British prime minister, he became the fifth UK leader to take up the position in six years.
Unleashed on the UK by Brexit, this represented exceptional governmental instability. So what term captures what is unfolding in the French Republic, now on its fifth premier in 24 months – with three in the past 10 months?
The current premier, the recently reappointed Sébastien Lecornu, may have secured a temporary reprieve on that day, abandoning Emmanuel Macron’s key pension reform in exchange for support from Socialist lawmakers as the cost of his government’s survival.
But it is, at best, a short-term solution. The EU’s second-largest economy is trapped in a political permacrisis, the scale of which it has not witnessed for decades – possibly not since the establishment of its Fifth French Republic in 1958 – and from which there appears no simple way out.
Key background: from the moment Macron initiated an ill-advised snap general election in 2024, France has had a divided assembly separated into three warring blocs – the left, far right and his own centre-right alliance – without any group holding a clear majority.
At the same time, the nation faces dual debt and deficit crises: its debt-to-GDP ratio and deficit are now nearly double the EU threshold, and strict legal timelines to approve a 2026 budget that at least begins to rein in spending are approaching.
In this challenging environment, both Lecornu’s immediate predecessors – Michel Barnier, who served from September to December 2024, and François Bayrou, who took office from December 2024 to September 2025 – were ousted by the assembly.
In September, the president appointed his close ally Lecornu as his latest PM. But when, a little over two weeks ago, Lecornu presented his government team – which turned out to be much the same as the old one – he faced fury from both supporters and rivals.
So much so that the next day, he stepped down. After only 27 days as premier, Lecornu became the shortest-lived premier in modern French history. In a dignified speech, he cited political rigidity, saying “partisan attitudes” and “personal ambitions” would make his job all but impossible.
Another twist in the tale: shortly after Lecornu’s resignation, Macron requested he remain for two more days in a final attempt to salvage cross-party backing – a mission, to put it gently, filled with challenges.
Next, two ex-prime ministers publicly turned on the embattled president. Meanwhile, the far-right National Rally (RN) and radical left France Unbowed (LFI) refused to meet Lecornu, promising to vote down any and every new government unless there were snap elections.
Lecornu stuck at his job, talking to everyone who was prepared to hear him out. At the end of his 48 hours, he appeared on television to say he thought “a solution remained possible” to prevent a vote. The leader's team confirmed the president would name a fresh premier 48 hours later.
Macron kept his promise – and on that Friday appointed … Sébastien Lecornu, again. So this week – with Macron helpfully sniping from the sidelines that the country’s rival political parties were “creating discord” and “entirely to blame for the turmoil” – was Lecornu’s moment of truth. Could he survive – and can he pass that vital budget?
In a critical address, the young prime minister outlined his financial plans, giving the Socialist party, who detest Macron’s unpopular pension overhaul, what they were waiting for: Macron’s flagship reform would be suspended until 2027.
With the right-wing LR already on board, the Socialists said they would refuse to support no-confidence motions tabled against Lecornu by the extremist factions – meaning the government should survive those ballots, scheduled for Thursday.
It is, nevertheless, by no means certain to be able to approve its €30bn austerity budget: the PS clearly stated that it would be demanding further compromises. “This move,” said its head, Olivier Faure, “is just the start.”
The problem is, the more Lecornu cedes to the centre-left, the more he will meet resistance from the centre-right. And, like the PS, the conservatives are themselves split on dealing with the administration – some are still itching to topple it.
A glance at the parliamentary arithmetic shows how difficult his mission – and longer-term survival – will be. A combined 264 lawmakers from the RN, radical-left LFI, Greens, Communists and UDR want him out.
To achieve that, they need a majority of 288 votes in parliament – so if they can convince only 24 of the PS’s 69 members or the LR’s 47 representatives (or both) to vote with them, Macron’s fifth unstable premier in 24 months is, like his predecessors, finished.
Most expect this to occur soon. Even if, by an unlikely turn, the divided parliament summons up the collective responsibility to pass a budget by year-end, the prospects for the government beyond that look bleak.
So does an exit exist? Snap elections would be unlikely to solve the problem: surveys indicate pretty much every party bar the RN would see reduced representation, but there would still be no clear majority. A fresh premier would confront identical numerical challenges.
An alternative might be for Macron himself to resign. After winning the presidential election, his successor would disband the assembly and hope to secure a parliamentary majority in the following election. But that, too, is uncertain.
Polls suggest the next occupant of the Elysée Palace will be Le Pen or Bardella. There is at least an strong possibility that French electorate, having elected a far-right president, might reconsider giving them parliamentary power.
Ultimately, France may not emerge from its quagmire until its politicians acknowledge the changed landscape, which is that clear majorities are a bygone phenomenon, absolute victory is obsolete, and compromise is not synonymous with failure.
Numerous observers believe that transformation will not be feasible under the existing governmental framework. “This isn't a standard political crisis, but a crise de régime” that will endure indefinitely.
“The system wasn't built to encourage – and actively discourages – the formation of ruling alliances typical across Europe. The Fifth Republic could be in its final stage.”
